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Abstract: It is often argued that while biases routinely influence the 
generation of scientific theories (in the ‘context of discovery’), a 
subsequent rational evaluation of such theories (in the ‘context of 
justification’) will ensure that biases do not affect which theories are 
ultimately accepted. Against this line of thought, this paper shows that 
the existence of certain kinds of biases at the generation-stage implies the 
existence of biases at the evaluation-stage. The key argumentative move 
is to recognize that a scientist who comes up with a new theory about 
some phenomena has thereby gained an unusual type of evidence, viz. 
information about the space of theories that could be true of the 
phenomena. It follows that if there is bias in the generation of scientific 
theories in a given domain, then the rational evaluation of theories with 
reference to the total evidence in that domain will also be biased. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is hardly controversial at this point that scientists’ own human interests, 
identities, and ideologies can influence the content of science, i.e. which theories 
are accepted as true within a particular science. To take a well-known example 
from evolutionary anthropology, it was once nearly uniformly accepted that the 
carved stones used as tools by our hominoid ancestors, and which are thought to 
have provided selection pressure for bipedalism and greater intelligence, were 
primarily used for hunting other animals. This ‘man-the-hunter’ model of human 
evolution was only seriously challenged with the influx of significant numbers 
of women into evolutionary anthropology in the 1970s. At that point, a ‘woman-
the-gatherer’ model was proposed according to which the carved stones were 
primarily used to prepare edible vegetation. This episode exemplifies a general 
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phenomenon, widely discussed by feminist thinkers, of science being biased 
against theories that challenge dominant ideologies and power structures.1 
 But how, exactly, do the theories accepted in science become biased by the 
biases of those who practice it? Put differently, how do scientists’ own social, 
political, and moral values – when biased – undermine the objectivity of scientific 
theories? Several influential accounts have been proposed to answer this and 
related questions, appealing to factors such as the role of background 
assumptions in scientific reasoning (Longino 1990; Intemann 2005), differing 
thresholds for inductive risk (Rudner 1953, Hempel 1965, Douglas 2000, 2009), 
and the ways in which scientific theory choice is based on ‘cognitive’ and ‘non-
cognitive’ criteria (Kuhn 1977, Longino 1996). However, discussions of scientific 
objectivity have generally steered conspicuously clear of appealing to the effect 
of biases on theory generation, i.e. the process by which scientific theories are 
conceived of and formulated. For example, Longino (1994: 141-149) discusses five 
distinct ways in which gender and racial biases can influence scientific research, 
none of which concerns the generation of theories.2 Similarly, Reiss and 
Sprenger’s (2017: §3.1) list “four stages at which values [and thus biases] may 
affect sciences” without mentioning the stage at which scientists conceive of and 
formulate their theories.3 
Apparently, then, the possibility of biases in theory generation has not 
generally been viewed as a significant threat to scientific objectivity. Indeed, even 
defenders of strong conceptions of scientific objectivity, such as the logical 
positivists, have seemed happy to acknowledge that biases influence which 
theories are conceived of and formulated. For example, as Reiss and Sprenger 
(2017: §3.2) point out, Reichenbach (1938: 6-7) is standardly interpreted as 
introducing the distinction between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of 
justification’ in order to argue that biases influence the former but not the latter. 
 
1 This particular episode is discussed at length by Longino (1990: 106- & 128-131); see 
also Longino and Doell (1983). 
2 Longino‘s elements are (i) research practices, (ii) research questions, (iii) research data, 
(iv) specific background assumptions, and (v) general background assumptions. 
3 Reiss and Sprenger’s stages are (i) choosing a research problem, (ii) gathering evidence, 
(iii) accepting a theory, and (iv) the proliferation and application of results. Reiss and 
Sprenger are concerned with threats to scientific objectivity due to the influence of 
various moral, social and political values, but these values are more or less equivalent to 
what I define as a ‘bias’ below (see §2). Another example of discussions of objectivity 
and values that steers clear of theory generation is Elliot (2017). 
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On Reichenbach’s view, even though scientists’ biases “may influence the 
discovery, development and proliferation of a scientific theory,” they are 
„irrelevant for justifying the acceptance of a theory, and for assessing how 
evidence bears on theory” (Reiss and Sprenger 2017: §3.2). 
The idea here attributed to Reichenbach seems to be that even though 
theories may initially be generated in a biased way, a subsequent rational 
evaluation of scientific theories – e.g., by controlled experiments and systematic 
observation – will ensure that such biases do not affect which theories are 
ultimately accepted. Thus, although it is granted that the generation-stage of the 
scientific process is susceptible to various biases, the thought is that the 
evaluation-stage eliminates the effect of any such biases before scientific theories 
are accepted. This line of argument was perhaps most clearly expressed by 
Hempel: 
[...] scientific objectivity is safeguarded by the principle that while 
hypotheses and theories may be freely invented and proposed in 
science, they can be accepted into a body of scientific knowledge 
only if they pass critical scrutiny, which includes in particular the 
checking of suitable test implications by careful observation and 
experiment (Hempel 1966: 206).4 
Since this argument involves trying to confine the influence of biases to the 
generation of scientific theories, I will refer to it as the Confinement Defense of the 
objectivity of science. 
There are a number of ways of undermining this Confinement Defense. 
One obvious response is to reject or problematize the distinction between the 
contexts of discovery and justification, as Thomas Kuhn did so influentially 
(Kuhn 1962: 8; see also, e.g., Barnes 1972: 391; Knorr-Cetina 1981: 28-31; 
Kantorovich 1993: 101). Another type of response argues that even if 
Reichenbach’s context distinction can be drawn, it does not make scientific 
theories immune to biases since biases also enter into the context of justification 
in aforementioned ways, e.g. through background assumptions, thresholds for 
inductive risks, or the application of cognitive/non-cognitive criteria in theory 
 
4 Similar arguments are often advocated by scientists themselves. Witness, for example, 
Carl Sagan in his popular television program Cosmos: “There are many hypotheses in 
science which are wrong. That’s perfectly all right […] To be accepted, new ideas must 
survive the most rigorous standards of evidence and scrutiny” (Sagan 1990). 
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choice. Here I pursue a different line of response to the Confinement Defense, by 
developing an underappreciated argument proposed by Kathleen Okruhlik 
(1994). 
In short, this argument aims to show that if biases affect the generation of 
scientific theories (in the ‘context of discovery’), then such biases will also affect 
the rational evaluation of theories (in the ‘context of justification’). Since the 
Confinement Defense accepts the antecedent of this conditional but rejects its 
consequent, this in effect shows that the Confinement Defense is incoherent. 
Dialectically at least, the argument explored in this paper is thus more powerful 
than either of the two types of responses mentioned above. As we shall see, the 
argument presented in this paper is also more powerful than Okruhlik’s own 
version of the argument, since it will not be assumed here that we must adopt 
any specific model of rational theory evaluation in science. The key to this 
argument is to recognize that a scientist who comes up with a new theory about 
some phenomena has thereby gained an unusual type of evidence, viz. 
information about the space of theories that could be true of the phenomena. It 
follows, I argue, that if there is bias in the generation of scientific theories in a 
given domain, then the rational evaluation of theories with reference to the total 
evidence in that domain will also be biased. 
 
2. THE IMPLICATION THESIS 
Let us start by defining the type of bias we will be concerned with in this paper. 
As I will be using the term, an agent or process has a (theoretical) bias if she/it 
privileges theories (hypotheses, conjectures, models) in one class over 
corresponding theories in a relevant contrast class. For example, someone who 
has an androcentric bias privileges theories that support or emphasize 
masculinity and male points of view over corresponding theories that support or 
emphasize femininity and female points of view. A generation-bias is a more 
specific kind of (theoretical) bias that is exhibited by agents or processes that 
privilege the generation of one class of theories over another class of theories, in 
the sense of being more likely to generate theories in the former than in the latter. 
Similarly, an agent or process has an evaluation-bias if she/it privileges the 
rational evaluation of theories in one class over theories in another, in the sense 
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of being more likely to positively evaluate (e.g., by accepting or assigning a 
higher probability to) theories in the former class than theories in the latter.5 
It is worth noting that, so far, it is not built into these definitions that 
theoretical biases are pernicious in any way. Indeed, note that these definitions 
allow one to be biased in favor of truths as against falsehoods, or in favor what 
the evidence supports as against what it undermines. With that said, I will be 
interested in the kind of biases that favor one set of theories over another on the 
basis of considerations that (arguably) have nothing to do with truth or evidential 
support, such as gender and racial biases. These biases correspond roughly to 
what Longino (1990: 4-6) calls ‘contextual values’, i.e. the personal, social, and 
cultural values that belong to the broader context in which science is done (as 
opposed to the ‘constitutive values’ that determine what counts as acceptable 
scientific practice). In this paper, we will concentrate on this narrower set of 
biases grounded in contextual values.6 
Also worth noting is that I will mostly be interested in biases that operate 
at the level of groups or communities of scientists, rather than at the level of 
individual scientists. To motivate this focus, consider the possibility that the 
individual scientists that comprise a community could be heavily biased in 
‘opposite’ ways, so that the net effect of individual biases is an unbiased scientific 
community. For example, if roughly half of a scientific community has a strong 
androcentric evaluation-bias, while the other half has a correspondingly strong 
gynocentric evaluation-bias, then the overall effect might be that the community 
is no more likely to positively evaluate theories that support masculine or male 
points of view than those that support feminine or female point of view.7 The 
 
5 Note that my definition of ‘bias’ here differs from Antony’s ‘empiricist’ definition of 
bias as “possession of belief or interest prior to investigation” (Antony 1993: 188). For 
the purposes of this paper, a more ‘operational’ definition is appropriate, i.e. one on 
which bias can be identified in terms of the agent’s dispositions to behave in certain ways 
rather than her belief or interests (which may or may not be manifested in the agent’s 
behavior). Furthermore, it is not at all clear whether, or how, Antony’s definition could 
be made to subsume implicit biases, which are usually taken to be non-doxastic states 
(i.e. not beliefs) and which clearly need not line up with the agent’s interests. 
6 Thus, in what follows, the term ‘bias’ should always be taken to refer to biases that are 
grounded in contextual values. 
7 Indeed, a number of feminist thinkers have argued that the most promising way to 
make science as a whole more objective or unbiased is to ensure that scientists have 
complementary biases in roughly this way (see, e.g., Longino 1990, 2002; Antony 1993; 
Solomon 2001). 
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more worrying phenomenon is when a scientific community as a whole exhibits 
a bias, e.g. because while some of the scientists are relatively unbiased, a large 
enough subgroup is heavily biased in the roughly the same way. It is this type of 
community-level bias that I will primarily be concerned with here. 
Given these stipulations of the kinds of biases I will be concerned with, 
the thesis for which I will be arguing in this paper is, roughly, that if there is 
generation-bias in some theoretical domain, then there is also evaluation-bias 
within that same domain. In slogan form, generation-bias implies evaluation-bias; I 
will refer to this as the Implication Thesis. However, let me immediately flag that I 
will later qualify this by locating a specific subcategory of generation-bias – what 
I will call competitor-generation-bias – and argue that this specific type of 
generation-bias implies evaluation-bias. Although I will thus be arguing for a 
qualified Implication Thesis, the upshot is much the same for defenses of 
scientific objectivity such as the Confinement Defense (more on this in section 5). 
 Let me end this section by contrasting the claim for which I will be arguing 
with a more innocuous sense in which biases in the generation of scientific 
theories effect how such theories are rationally evaluated. Clearly, scientists can 
only evaluate theories that have already been formulated, so if the set of theories 
that have been generated is biased, then so too is the set of theories that could be 
evaluated as confirmed (or, indeed, as disconfirmed) by the available evidence. 
In this way, positive theory evaluation, and thus the potential acceptance of 
theories, is necessarily constrained by the (possibly biased) process of generating 
theories.8 This point, although of course correct, is significantly weaker than the 
thesis for which I will argue in the present paper.9 My point will not merely be 
 
8 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I contrast the Implication 
Thesis with this more innocuous point.  
9 Indeed, it seems to me that this point would not threaten the Confinement Defense of 
scientific objectivity at all, at least not on a plausible construal thereof. After all, a 
proponent of the Confinement Defense could respond that, even granting this point, 
each individual theory that has in fact been generated and evaluated (positively or 
negatively) would be evaluated in just the same way regardless of whether it and its 
competitors were generated in a biased way. In particular, such a proponent could argue 
that a theory that is sufficiently positively evaluated to be accepted would still be 
evaluated in just the same way regardless of whether its generation was biased or 
unbiased. Thus the fact that only theories that have been generated could be (positively) 
evaluated would not threaten the central contention of the Confinement Defense that 
biases in theory generation do not undermine our reasons for accepting the theories that 
we do in fact accept. 
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that scientists can only evaluate theories that have been generated, but that some 
forms of theory generation effect what the result of the evaluations will be, i.e. 
whether and the extent to which such an evaluation is positive or negative. Put 
differently, my contention here is not simply that biases in theory generation 
effect whether some theory is evaluated – and thus potentially accepted – but also 
how (positively or negatively) the theory is evaluated. 
 
3. OKRUHLIK’S ARGUMENT 
The argument that I will give for the Implication Thesis (or a qualified version 
thereof) is inspired by, and can be viewed as a development of, an 
underappreciated argument given by Kathleen Okruhlik.10 Before I spell out my 
own version of the argument, I will briefly consider Okruhlik’s original argument 
and what I consider to be an important limitation of the argument. 
In her “Gender and the Biological Sciences” (1994), Okruhlik argues that 
what I am calling the Confinement Defense “makes no sense at all” if we accept 
what she refers to as an “irreducibly comparative” model of scientific rationality 
(Okruhlik 1994: 33). According to Okruhlik, non-comparative models of theory 
evaluation in science have become obsolete: “we now recognize that one does not 
actually compare the test hypothesis to nature directly in the hope of getting a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ (‘true’ or ‘false’) answer; nor does one compare it to all logically 
possible rival hypotheses” (Okruhlik 1994: 33). Rather, says Okruhlik, one always 
compares a hypothesis with other available hypotheses that have been 
articulated and developed to the point of being testable.11 From this Okruhlik 
 
10 Another argument that comes close to the one I will make below is sketched briefly by 
Elliot and McKaughan (2009: 607-608), who argue that proposing new theories “can 
transform what appeared to be irrelevant facts into crucial pieces of evidence” (Elliot 
and McKaughan 2009: 608). However, it is not clear from Elliot and McKaughan’s brief 
discussion what it is for evidence to be ‘transformed’ in their sense, especially since they 
appear to deny that this type of transformation “alter[s] the evidential relationship 
between the available theories and data” (Elliot and McKaughan 2009: 608). By contrast, 
I argue below that proposing new theories can make it rational to evaluate old theories 
less favorably (e.g., by it becoming rational to assign a lower probability to them), even 
when there is no change in the relevant empirical data. In this sense, pace Elliot and 
McKaughan, I maintain that proposing new theories can alter the evidential relationship 
between available theories and data. 
11 This idea is reminiscent of some early conceptions of Inference to the Best Explanation 
(IBE), where the evaluative step merely renders the comparative verdict that one theory 
provides a better explanation than available alternatives (e.g., Harman 1965; Thagard 
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infers that evaluations of theories, even when perfectly rational, cannot 
determine whether a theory is likely to be true or false in an absolute sense, but 
“only that it is epistemically superior to the other actually available contenders” 
(Okruhlik 1994: 34). 
As Okruhlik points out, this would mean that contra the Confinement 
Defense, “nothing in the appraisal machinery will completely ‘purify’ the 
successful theory” (Okruhlik 1994: 34). In short, this is because a theory may be 
epistemically superior to the theories in one class of available alternatives but not 
another. So, if the set of available theories – i.e. the set of theories that have been 
generated in a given domain – is disproportionally populated by theories which 
conform to some particular bias, then the theory that ends up being evaluated as 
the ‘best’ of these available theories will presumably be more likely to conform 
to that bias as well. In the extreme case, every single one of the available theories 
would conform to the bias in question, in which case the ‘best’ of them would 
inevitably do so as well. 
It is worth emphasizing that Okruhlik’s argument relies on her 
assumption that scientific methodology is capable only of delivering 
comparative evaluations of scientific theories – i.e. her ‘irreducibly comparative’ 
model of scientific rationality. The idea here is not merely that comparisons 
between available theories is an important part of the scientific process, in that 
such comparisons will figure as part of the input, or part of the process itself, of 
rational theory evaluation. That much is undeniable and uncontroversial – 
theories are clearly not evaluated in isolation from other competing theories. 
Indeed, as we shall see, even models of scientific rationality that are non-
comparative in Okruhlik’s sense – i.e., in the sense of rendering science capable 
of delivering absolute verdicts regarding its theories – can accommodate this 
rather straightforward point about the importance of comparisons in theory 
evaluation. 
However, Okruhlik also makes the stronger claim that scientific 
methodology is incapable of delivering verdicts that are stronger than the 
comparative claim that one theory is ‘epistemically superior’ to its extant rivals. 
This is a claim that concerns the output, rather than the input or the process itself, 
of scientific theory evaluations. In particular, Okruhlik claims that one cannot 
 
1978). However, as I explain below, Okruhlik’s model is much more radically 
comparative than standard conceptions of IBE. 
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determine whether a claim is true or false, or indeed probably true or false, since 
this goes beyond the comparative claim that one hypothesis is superior to 
another.12 In order to flag this specific and stronger sense in which Okruhlik 
suggests that scientific rationality is ‘irreducibly comparative’, I will refer to 
Okruhlik’s model of scientific rationality as irreducibly verdict-comparative. 
Okruhlik’s commitment to the idea that scientific rationality is irreducibly 
verdict-comparative is essential to her argument against the Confinement 
Defense; Okruhlik’s argument does not go through without it. To see why, note 
that if scientific methodology were capable of delivering absolute as opposed to 
merely comparative evaluations, the Confinement Defense will simply claim that 
each theory can be evaluated as (probably) true or false regardless of which 
theories have been generated at a particular point in time. It doesn’t matter 
whether, in the process of making this kind of absolute evaluation of theories, 
scientists often (or even always) compare one theory to another. After all, 
Okruhlik is not arguing that evaluative comparisons between theories are 
themselves subject to biases; rather, her argument is explicitly meant to establish 
that biased theory-generation would lead to biased theory-acceptance even if it 
is granted for the sake of the argument that comparisons between theories are 
unbiased (Okruhlik 1994: 33). 
In my view, Okruhlik’s argument gets at something important and is 
underappreciated in the current literature on scientific objectivity, bias and 
values. However, its reliance on the idea that scientific rationality is irreducibly 
verdict-comparative is a significant weakness of the argument in its current form. 
This is so for two related reasons. First, appealing to an irreducibly verdict-
comparative model of scientific rationality is dialectically weak, since most if not 
all proponents of the Confinement Defense will reject such a model for 
independent reasons. Contrary to what Okruhlik seems to suggest, philosophers 
of science do not generally reject contrary models of scientific rationality, i.e. 
what we may call verdict-absolutist models. Indeed, the model of scientific 
rationality that has the strongest claim to being the current orthodoxy among 
 
12 Thus Okruhlik would have to deny, for example, that the best explanation of one’s 
evidence is probably and/or approximately true. On her view, assuming she accepts 
some form of IBE (see previous footnote), we could at most assert that it is likelier to the 
true, or perhaps more approximately true, than available rival explanations. 
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philosophers of science is Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT),13 which dictates 
that each scientific theory under consideration be assigned an absolute numerical 
probability value. This clearly goes beyond a mere comparative verdict that one 
theory is epistemically superior to another. It is of course true that, given the 
absolute probabilities of two theories T1 and T2, we can also (trivially) compare 
their probabilities within BCT. But the point here is that BCT is not irreducibly 
verdict-comparative, since such a comparison is based on – and reduces to – a 
comparison of absolute probabilities. 
Indeed, the same is true of the other model of scientific rationality that 
enjoys widespread popularity among philosophers of science, Inference to the Best 
Explanation (IBE). For although an instance of IBE certainly involves a 
comparative evaluation of one theory as providing a ‘better’ explanation than 
competing theories, it also involves inferring that the relevant theory is (probably 
and/or approximately) true, as opposed to merely that the theory is 
epistemically superior to alternatives (Douven 2017a: §2). The comparison 
involved in IBE with reference to theories’ explanatory virtues is a step in the 
process of making the inference; it is not the inference’s conclusion or verdict. 
Indeed, the fact that the conclusion of IBE is absolute while the explanatory 
comparison involved in it isn’t gives rise to a well-known problem for IBE, viz. 
that the best explanation might merely be the best of a bad lot (van Fraassen 1989: 
142-3).14 So even IBE, which is comparative in an important sense, involves 
arriving at the kind of absolute (‘yes’ or ‘no’) verdicts that Okruhlik’s conception 
of scientific rationality explicitly does not allow for. 
Second, Okruhlik’s contention that theory evaluation is irreducibly 
verdict-comparative is implausible as a description of actual scientific practice (or 
indeed as a prescription for what science ought to be like), because scientists can 
 
13 The dominance of BCT among contemporary philosophers of science is acknowledged 
by its proponents (e.g., Earman 1993: 2; Strevens 2017: 5) as well as its critics (e.g., 
Godfrey-Smith 2003: 202; Norton 2018: 3). 
14 Douven (2017b) refers to this problem as the asymmetry problem. On Douven’s 
description of the problem, the issue is that most formulations of IBE “license an 
inference to an absolute verdict—that a given hypothesis is true—from what will 
typically only be a relative judgment, namely, that the hypothesis is the best explanation 
among those on the table” (Douven 2017b: 9). It is perhaps worth noting that some 
influential conceptions of IBE propose to avoid this problem by including an ‘absolutist’ 
requirement on the conditions for IBE to the effect that the inferred explanation should 
not merely be the best, but also “satisfactory” (Musgrave 1988) or “good enough” 
(Lipton 2004); see also Dellsén (2017, 2018) for a different approach to the problem. 
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and do reach non-comparative verdicts about many scientific theories. Consider, 
for instance, the theory of natural selection, the atomic theory of matter, the 
double-helix structure of DNA, the kinetic theory of heat, and the theory that 
human activity is a significant cause of increased global temperatures 
(anthropogenic climate change). According to Okruhlik’s model of scientific 
rationality, the most we can say about these theories is that they are 
‘epistemically superior’ to their extant rivals. However, if these theories could 
not be evaluated absolutely, i.e. as probably true or false, scientists would not be 
justified in relying on them for predictions, explanations, and public engagement 
in the way that they often do. For example, when IPCC scientists announced that 
“[i]t is very likely [defined as probability 90-100%] that human influence has 
contributed to the observed global scale changes in the frequency and intensity 
of daily temperature extremes since the mid-20th century” (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2014: 7), they were explicitly reporting an absolute 
estimation. They were not, by contrast, merely reporting that the relevant claim 
is epistemically superior to currently available alternatives.  
None of this is to deny that the availability of competing theories plays an 
important role in scientific reasoning. Indeed, my argument below for a qualified 
Implication Thesis is partly based on an analysis of how the availability of 
competing theories influences rational evaluation of scientific theories. However, 
Okruhlik’s contention that it is impossible to reach non-comparative verdicts in 
scientific theory evaluation greatly overstates the extent to which competing 
theories dictate this process, and thus opens up Okruhlik’s argument to the 
charge that its key assumption – that scientific rationality is irreducibly verdict-
comparative – does not square either with scientific practice or with widely 
accepted models of scientific rationality, such as Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
and Inference to the Best Explanation. 
 
4. THEORIES AS EVIDENCE (OF A SORT) 
During the decade following the publication of Einstein’s special theory of 
relativity in 1905, European physicists became increasingly confident that 
Einstein’s new theory was true, and that its previously-accepted alternatives, 
such as Lorentz’s ether theory, were false. And yet, as Earman (1992: 196-7) 
points out, little new empirical evidence pertaining to these alternative theories 
was recorded during the period. Indeed, Einstein’s own paper (Einstein 1905) 
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famously did not report any new observations or experiments; rather, the paper 
simply appealed to some well-known physical anomalies, such as the fact that 
no ether drift had ever been observed, and formulated a new theory that seemed 
to explain these empirical phenomena better than any of the previously available 
theories. 
The important point here is that physicists came to significantly re-
evaluate previously available theories (such as Lorentz’s ether theory) over a 
period when they gained next to no new empirical evidence. But this presents us 
with an apparent difficulty: On the one hand, if one gains no new evidence 
between one point in time and another, it seems that rationality would require 
that one’s evaluation of any theory should remain the same (at least if one’s initial 
evaluation of the theory was itself rational). On the other hand, common sense 
and scientific practice both suggest that it was rational for physicists to 
significantly change their evaluation of Lorentz’s ether theory, for example, when 
learning about Einstein’s new theory. How can these two claims be reconciled? 
The answer is simple: Einstein’s discovery of the special theory of 
relativity does constitute a type of evidence after all, viz. additional information 
about the space of theories that could explain the physical phenomena in 
question. Whereas it was previously thought that any plausible theory of the 
mechanics of moving bodies would have to posit an absolute reference frame in 
which the physical laws held true, Einstein’s discovery of special relativity 
revealed (among other things) that this assumption was not necessary. Thus, 
Einstein’s theory effectively showed that a region of logical space that was 
previously thought to be ruled out by experiment does indeed contain plausible 
contenders to then-dominant theories such as Lorentz’s ether theory.15 
Of course, this piece of theoretical information is clearly not of the usual 
empirical kind that we tend to associate with the term ‘evidence’. But it is also 
clear that it still counts as information of the sort that a rational agent should take 
into account when evaluating a given scientific theory. If we want to reserve the 
term ‘evidence’ for empirical evidence, such as observations and experimental 
 
15 The type of situation described here is in a sense the converse of the current situation 
in particle physics, in which repeated failed attempts to come up with a plausible 
alternative to string theory has arguably contributed to scientists becoming quite 
confident that no such alternative exists (Dawid 2013; Dawid, Hartmann, and Sprenger 
2015). 
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results, then we could say that Einstein’s discovery is evidence in an extended sense. 
Which label we choose for Einstein’s discovery is not important for our purposes; 
what’s important is that it is possible to gain a type of purely theoretical 
information about the space of theories that could explain a given set of data, and 
that this type of information can alter the rational evaluation of previously 
available explanations for that data. 
It is worth noting that the point I am making here has been implicitly and 
explicitly acknowledged by both proponents and critics of Bayesian 
Confirmation Theory (BCT).16 Thus sympathetic critics of BCT, such as Chihara 
(1987: 556-60) and Earman (1992: 195-8) argue that discoveries of new alternative 
theories of precisely this sort present a special difficulty for BCT, because 
Bayesian conditionalization cannot explain the rationality of assigning 
probabilities to entirely new theories and changing one’s probabilities in the old 
theories. This is known as the problem of new theories (related, but not identical, to 
the problem of old evidence – see Glymour 1980). In response, Bayesians such as 
Maher (1995) and Wenmeckers and Romeijn (2013) argue that conservative 
extensions of orthodox Bayesianism can provide a rule for assigning probabilities 
to new theories and for modifying the probabilities assigned to extant theories. 
My concern here is not with determining which, if any, of these Bayesian 
responses to the problem of new theories is correct. Rather, I mention this debate 
in order to highlight that the very notion that new theories present a problem for 
BCT presupposes that discovering new theories can have the epistemic impact 
that I have described – i.e. that it counts as ‘evidence’ in the extended sense 
identified above. To see this clearly, consider how the Bayesian will describe the 
evidential situation before and after discovering a new theory Tnew. Before 
discovering Tnew, the Bayesian agent will assign subjective probabilities to a set 
of already-conceived competing theories T1,…,Tk (not including Tnew), along with 
a ‘catch-all hypothesis’ C which effectively asserts that T1,…,Tk are all false. The 
axioms of the probability calculus demand that these probabilities, 
Pbefore(T1),…,Pbefore(Tk), and Pbefore(C) sum to unity. After discovering Tnew, the 
 
16 I choose to focus on BCT in what follows in part because it is by far the most widely 
endorsed framework for rational theory evaluation among philosophers of science (see 
footnote 13); in part because BCT clearly provides the means to evaluate theories in an 
absolute – i.e. not merely comparative – manner (in contrast to Okruhlik’s ‘irreducably 
comparative’ model); and in part because BCT has well-known prima facie difficulties in 
handling the epistemic impact of new theories. 
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Bayesian agent will assign probabilities to the original theories T1,…,Tk; the new 
theory Tnew; and a new catch-all hypothesis Cnew which asserts that T1,…,Tk and 
Tnew are all false. As before, the probability axioms demand that these new 
probability assignments, Pafter(T1),…,Pafter(Tk), Pafter(Tnew), and Pafter(Cnew), sum to 
unity. Thus, unless our Bayesian agent had already somehow anticipated that 
she would come to discover a plausible new theory, she will assign a higher 
probability to the disjunction of Tnew and Cnew, i.e. to the claim that the new theory 
is true or that some yet-to-be-conceived theory is true, than she assigned to the 
original catch-all C.17 But then it follows that, in order to satisfy the demands of 
the probability axioms, the Bayesian agent must lower her probability 
assignments regarding at least some of the theories T1,…,Tk – in particular, she 
must adjust them such that Pbefore(T1) + … + Pbefore(Tk) > Pafter(T1) + … + Pafter(Tk).18 
Of course, this does not by itself solve the Bayesian problem of new 
evidence, for it does not say what probability to assign to Tnew after discovering 
it, or indeed how exactly to adjust the probability of T1,…,Tk.19 What it does show 
is that any general solution to the problem of new evidence must allow for the 
probabilities for T1,…,Tk to change in light of the discovery of the new theory Tnew 
and subsequent probability assignments to Tnew and the new catch-all Cnew. Thus 
the discovery of Tnew is ‘evidence’ in this extended sense of being a piece of 
information that should, rationally, lead one to alter one’s subjective probabilities 
– in this case, by lowering the probability assignments to competing theories 
T1,…,Tk. This is of course exactly what happened in the case discussed above, 
 
17 Any general Bayesian solution must at least allow for this possibility. Indeed, this is 
exactly the sort of situation that is described when the problem of new evidence is 
described (see, e.g. Earman 1992: 196-7). 
18 To see this, note first that since Cnew is (by construction) incompatible with Tnew, the 
probability of their disjunction is equal to the sum of their individual probabilities: 
Pafter(Tnew or Cnew) = Pafter(Tnew) + Pafter(Cnew). So the situation we are focusing on is one 
where: 
(1) Pbefore(C) > Pafter(Tnew) + Pafter(Cnew) 
Now, as noted, the probability axioms demand that the probabilities before and after 
both sum to unity, i.e. that: 
(2) Pbefore(T1) + … + Pbefore(Tk) + Pbefore(C) = Pafter(T1) + … + Pafter(Tk) + Pafter(Tnew) + 
Pafter(Cnew) = 1 
(1) and (2) jointly entail that Pbefore(T1) + … + Pbefore(Tk) > Pafter(T1) + … + Pafter(Tk), as 
desired. 
19 For that, I refer the reader to Maher 1995 and Wenmeckers and Romeijn 2013. 
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where Einstein’s special theory of relativity plays the role of the new theory Tnew 
and Lorentz’s ether theory as one of T1,…,Tk. 
This brief excursion into Bayesian territory may have given the impression 
that the type of non-empirical evidence I am concerned with can only be 
accounted for in a Bayesian framework, BCT. Not so.20 As the example of 
Einstein’s discovery of special relativity illustrates, scientists can, due to their 
theoretical discovery of a previously unconceived alternative, come to rationally 
reevaluate theories even in the absence of empirical evidence for or against those 
theories. This is a datum – a fact of scientific life – that any model of scientific 
rationality worth its salt will have to reckon with in one way or another. Thus a 
model of scientific rationality that fails to account for the possibility of rational 
reevaluations of this type is ipso facto inadequate. While I have used BCT to 
illustrate how such a reevaluation could be manifested in that particular model, 
the same phenomenon will therefore necessarily resurface in any adequate 
account of scientific rationality that could serve as an alternative to BCT. 
 
5. THE IMPLICATION THESIS REVISITED 
For our purposes, the crucial upshot of these considerations is that the extent to 
which a given scientific theory is positively evaluated depends in part on 
whether (and the extent to which) plausible alternative theories have been 
conceived and formulated. To see what this has to do with the Implication Thesis, 
note that with respect to an extant theory T, scientists can be more and less likely 
to develop alternatives to T – i.e., competing theories of the same set of 
phenomena. Thus it may happen that due to some contextual value, scientists are 
more (or less) likely to develop alternatives to T than they would otherwise be, 
e.g. if T challenges a prevalent gender stereotype. This would be a kind of 
generation-bias in favor of the class of alternatives to T; let us call it competitor-
generation-bias. 
Let me illustrate this type of bias with a couple of examples from the 
history of science. First consider R. A. Fischer’s opposition to the causal link 
between smoking and lung cancer (Fischer 1959). After a distinguished career as 
a statistician and geneticist, Fischer retired from his position at Cambridge in 
 
20 Indeed, as noted in footnote 16, I have chosen to discuss how to model this type of 
evidence within BCT in part because it is initially not at all obvious that BCT could 
accommodate evidence of this type at all. 
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1957 and shortly afterward began to publicly question the notion that smoking 
causes lung cancer, which was increasingly becoming widely accepted by 
medical researchers at the time. One of Fischer’s main lines of opposition 
consisted in developing an alternative hypothesis to explain the well-
documented statistical correlation between smoking and lung cancer. In 
particular, Fischer proposed that lung cancer causes smoking rather than the 
other way around, via an unconscious irritation or pain that is caused by lung 
cancer and that causes (increased) smoking. As Fischer puts it, “anyone suffering 
from a chronic inflammation in part of the body (something that does not give 
rise to conscious pain) is not unlikely to be associated with smoking more 
frequently, or smoking rather than not smoking” (1959: 22). 
I leave it to the reader to decide whether Fischer’s explanation was 
plausible, even relative to the empirical evidence available at the time. The 
important point here is that Fischer’s proposal of this hypothesis was fairly 
clearly influenced by what we would now refer to as his contextual values. Not 
only was Fischer himself a smoker of cigarettes and pipes; he was also a political 
conservative who was skeptical of taxation and government regulation of private 
industry, such as that which was being proposed to reduce smoking; 
furthermore, Fischer also received a fee from the tobacco industry (although to 
be fair Stolley (1991: 425) estimates that the fee was “probably not large”). In sum, 
although it is certainly possible for Fischer’s interest in proposing alternative 
explanations of the correlation between smoking and lung cancer to have been 
motivated by non-contextual factors, it is at least plausible that this episode 
illustrates the influence of contextual bias at the stage of generating theories. 
The other example that I propose as plausibly exemplifying competitor-
generation-bias concerns evolutionary explanations of female orgasm. On one 
way of carving up logical space, there are two possible types of evolutionary 
explanations of the fact that female humans have orgasms in sexual intercourse: 
this is either an adaptation – i.e. a trait that has been selected for in natural 
selection – or a spandrel – i.e. a trait that has evolved as a byproduct of some other 
trait or evolutionary process. Each type of explanation will have to be fleshed out 
so as to answer its own distinctive types of questions. For example, the first type 
of explanation will have to spell out what selection pressures gave rise to female 
orgasm, while the second type will have to say what the female orgasm is a 
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byproduct of. So there is considerable room for theorizing within each of the two 
explanation-types. 
Nevertheless, as Lloyd’s (2005; see also 1993) documents, the theoretical 
landscape is dominated by adaptation-based explanations. Of the 21 
explanations Lloyd reviews, all but one assume that the female orgasm is an 
adaptation rather than a spandrel. This apparent preference for adaptation-based 
explanations is not justified by the available evidence, which is at best equivocal 
and at worst favors spandrel-based explanations over its adaptation-based 
counterparts.21 Lloyd attributes this surprising situation in part to a general bias 
in evolutionary biology for adaptationist explanations, but also – and more 
significantly for our purposes – to androcentrism, including the implicit 
assumption that female sexuality is like male sexuality; and to a focus on 
procreation as the only type of evolutionarily significant sexual intercourse 
(Lloyd 2005: 229-235). The latter are clearly based on contextual values, and thus 
count as (contextual) biases in the relevant sense. Specifically, they are a form of 
competitor-generation-bias, since they influence the generation of explanations 
for female orgasm which could serve as alternatives to the various adaptation-
based explanations that currently dominate the field. 
 Now, what has this to do with the Implication Thesis and the Confinement 
Defense of scientific objectivity? Well, as we have seen, the availability of 
plausible competitors to a given theory undermines the epistemic status of that 
theory in a rational evaluation (as the availability of special relativity 
undermined the epistemic status of Lorentz’s ether theory). Thus if there is a 
competitor-generation-bias in favor of generating alternatives to T, then the 
epistemic status of T will be more likely to be undermined by the presence of 
plausible alternatives than it would otherwise be. It follows that, all other things 
being equal, scientists will be less likely to have a positive rational evaluation of 
T than they would otherwise have, due to nothing other than the fact that there 
is a competitor-generation-bias in favor of generating alternatives to T. This 
establishes the Implication Thesis in a suitably qualified form: competitor-
generation-bias implies evaluation-bias. 
Importantly, this argument does not presuppose any specific conception 
of scientific rationality or theory evaluation. Thus, while Okruhlik’s argument 
 
21 Lloyd herself (2005: 107-148) argues that the spandrel-based explanation, due to 
Symons (1979), is most plausible. 
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relied on an irreducibly verdict-comparative model of scientific rationality, the 
current argument goes through even if it is assumed that scientific theories can 
be, and are, rationally evaluated in an absolute or non-comparative manner – i.e., 
as (approximately and/or probably) true or false. Specifically, we have seen how 
the discovery of new competing theories can constitute a kind of evidence in an 
extended sense, in that it leads rational agents to revise their evaluations of 
previously available theories. This holds even on verdict-absolutist models of 
scientific reasoning such as Bayesian Confirmation Theory, since even Bayesians 
acknowledge that discovering new theories can and do have this type of 
epistemic impact. 
Where does this leave us with regard to the Confinement Defense of 
scientific objectivity? Recall that the Implication Thesis, if true, would make the 
Confinement Defense incoherent, since the latter explicitly grants the prevalence 
of biases in theory-generation but denies that they play any role in rational 
theory-evaluation. Of course, proponents of the Confinement Defense could 
avoid incoherence by retreating from the first claim, i.e. by denying the existence 
of generation-bias in science. However, this response suffers from the sheer 
implausibility of claiming that biases based on contextual values cannot play any 
role in the process of identifying and formulating scientific theories. The initial 
appeal of the Confinement Defense was that it seemed to offer a way of 
defending the scientific process as fundamentally rational even while admitting 
that one of its constituent parts, viz. theory-generation, would never be immune 
to bias. If the Implication Thesis is true, this is a hopeless task. 
Although I have argued for a qualified version of the Implication Thesis – 
i.e. that competitor-generation-bias implies evaluation-bias – the upshot for the 
Confinement Defense is much the same. If the qualified Implication Thesis is 
true, proponents of the Confinement Defense can only avoid incoherence by 
denying the existence of competitor-generation-biases, i.e. biases in favor of 
generating alternatives to some theories rather than others. But this too is 
exceedingly implausible in many cases, as is illustrated by Fischer’s development 
of the hypothesis that lung cancer causes smoking and the conspicuous dearth of 
spandrel-based explanations of female orgasm in comparison to (arguably 
androcentric and procreation-focused) adaptation-based explanations. More 
generally, it would be nothing short of a miracle if scientists’ ideologies, political 
beliefs, social commitments, etc. – in short, their contextual values – did not 
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regularly lead them to focus their attention on conceiving and formulating 
alternatives to some theories at the expense of others. This is especially so for 
theories with significant social or political implications, where scientists may 
have strong incentives to identify and develop alternative theories that accord 
with their contextual values – or the contextual values of those who fund or 
influence them. 
One might still insist that, ideally, scientists should generate all possible 
theories of a given phenomenon – or at least all those possible theories that would 
be worth taking seriously – before they evaluate and potentially accept any one 
of these. This would effectively eliminate the possibility of generation-bias at the 
time of theory evaluation, since it would make it impossible for the scientific 
community to be more likely to have generated theories in one class than in 
another. (All theories would be equally likely to have been generated, viz. 100% 
or maximally likely.)22 The obvious problem with this suggestion is that in actual 
scientific practice it is rarely, if ever, feasible to generate all or even most (serious) 
theories of any interesting phenomenon before any of them is evaluated. Science 
is done in real time, and this requires scientists to judge the plausibility of 
theories long before they could become confident that all or most possible 
theories have been generated. Of course, things would be different if scientists or 
humans generally were theoretically omniscient. But since they are not, and 
arguably never will be, this particular counterfactual is irrelevant to an analysis 
of how biases influence actual scientific practice. 
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Confinement Defense of the objectivity of science relies on the idea that the 
process of rationally evaluating scientific theories is not subject to bias even 
though the process of generating theories undeniably is. Developing an 
argument proposed by Okruhlik (1994), I have argued that this position is 
unstable, because the existence of one type of bias in the generation of scientific 
theories implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. In 
closing, I wish to draw out two broader implications of this argument for 
 
22 Recall the definition of ‘generation-bias’ at the beginning of section 2. 
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philosophy of science and the practical issue of how to organize scientific 
communities. 
First, the argument shows that philosophical discussions of scientific 
objectivity should not ignore biases that operate at the stage of theory-generation 
(i.e., in the ‘context of discovery’, in one sense of that term). All too often, what I 
have called generation-bias is ignored or treated as irrelevant in discussions of 
scientific objectivity and biases, presumably because it has been assumed that 
such biases do not ultimately affect which theories are accepted in science 
(Longino 1994: 141-149; Reiss and Sprenger 2017: §3.1; see also Elliot 2017: 10). 
The argument of the present paper shows that discussions of this kind are at best 
incomplete; at worst, they may falsely lead one to conclude that science will be 
objective or unbiased once the influence of (contextual) biases have been 
eliminated from the factors they do consider. 
Second, what are the practical implications of the above argument for how 
to counteract pernicious biases in science? Perhaps in contrast to some other 
kinds of biases that operate in science, it is hard to see how the issue of 
generation-bias could feasibly be addressed at the individual level, e.g. by 
reeducating individual scientists or incentivizing individual behaviors. After all, 
one cannot prevent scientists from conceiving of and proposing scientific theories 
that accord with their biases without instituting some form of active censuring or 
thought-policing. Accordingly, the more feasible solution may be to make sure 
that the scientific community at a given time exhibits diversity with regard to 
which kinds of theories each scientist is likely to generate.23 Even if each scientist 
within such a community is biased in their own way, diversity may ensure that 
the scientific community as a whole is relatively unbiased, since the bias of each 
scientist would be complemented with another scientist’s opposite bias.24 The 
upshot may thus be that the best way to promote the relevant kind of scientific 
 
23 Or at a minimum to try to minimize the effects of forces that cause scientific 
communities to become more homogenous in this regard, such as what Holman and 
Bruner (2017) call “industrial selection”. 
24 As I have noted above (footnote 7), similar solutions have been proposed to counteract 
other sorts of biases in science, e.g. by Longino (1990, 2002), Antony (1993) and Solomon 
(2001). 
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objectivity involves the independently desirable aim of diversifying scientific 
communities, e.g. with regard to gender and racial identities.25 
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